The aim of this paper is to explore the motivation of monetary transfers received by household heads. Indeed, the financial transfers may be motivated by altruism or by the expectation of future services. For this reason, we select a sample of
Introduction
According to the literature, private transfers are relevant both in developing countries and in highly developed economies (Danziger, Havernan and Plotnick 1981; Lampman and Smeeding 1983; Kotlikoff 1988; Guiso and Jappelli 1991) .
Moreover, private transfers are important for their persistence also across generations (Deb, Okten and Osili 2010 ). An interesting element of private transfers to be analyzed is the motivation. Indeed, as explained in Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2009) , parents' transfers motives are important for income redistribution, savings and public finance. The motivation underlying a transfer decision may be relative to altruism or exchange motive. According to Becker (1974) , an individual cares about the well-being of other individuals in the altruistic framework, while according to Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985) , the parent makes transfers to the children in order to obtain services from them.
It is possible to identify also a different behavior for family members. Indeed, Berry (2008) investigates to what extent young adult children can rely on their parents for financial support and he finds that parents give more inter vivos financial assistance to their disadvantaged children rather than focusing on children most able to give financial help in return.
As explained in Barro (1974) , the motives for private transfers are relevant for public policies that redistribute income. There are different ways to analyse the altruistic hypothesis in the literature. First, there are models which consider the bequest data (Ishikawa, 1975; Becker and Tomes, 1979; Adams, 1980; Menchik and David, 1983) . The result, that the bequest received is negatively associated to the recipient income, reveals that the altruistic hypothesis may be supported. Second, there are models which consider the way bequest behavior affects wealth mobility (Blinder, 1973; Menchik, 1979 and . In this context, the bequest rules assume a relevant role and not the characteristics of potential recipients.
Third, there is an empirical research which considers transfers as payments made in exchange services provided by family heads (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Kotlikoff, Shoven and Spivak, 1986) . However, there are also papers where parental transfers are not significant for children (Wolff 2006) .
In this paper we explore the motivation of monetary transfers received by household heads. For this reason, we select a sample of Italian families from the dataset. The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. First, we consider the transfer decision and try to account for the factors that affect the probability that the household member will receive a transfer. Next, we restrict our analysis to those families who did receive a positive transfer and examine the factors that affect the size of the transfer. Since the economic interest in the intrinsic explanation of monetary transfers is supported by the efficacy of policy makers instruments, we also explore the relationship between private and public financial transfers. This analysis assumes a particular relevance in this period, in which the most heavy financial crisis after that of 1929 produces still negative effects to real economy. The main contribution to the existing literature is to investigate the social motivation of private transfers and their implications in terms of policy in a unified framework.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical framework of private transfers; Section 3 outlines the effects of Government policies according to the link between public and private transfers. Section 4 presents the dataset while Section 5 illustrates models implemented in the analysis.
Section 6 shows and discusses the empirical results; in Section 7 we carry out an interesting analysis on the relationship between public and private transfers.
Section 8 concludes and points out suggestions for further research.
Theoretical Framework of Private Transfers
The simplest approach to model the monetary transfer is to consider the utility of the recipient into the utility function of the donor. According to Becker (1974) , it is assumed that individual i is concerned about j and maximizes the utility function
) where x i and x j represent the consumption of i and j respectively. The initial income levels of i and j are respectively y i and y j , while g i is a monetary transfer from i to j. Thus, the budget constraints for i and j may be written as:
The maximization problem for individual i becomes:
From (1) we may derive:
Since 0 dx i = for j i dy dy − = , we may obtain:
This is a relevant theoretical result, which is widely used in the empirical analysis to test for the altruism hypothesis. Choosing the interpretation that the individual i is the parent and the individual j is children in a family environment, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997) find that an increase in parent's income leads to an increase in the transfer and that an increase in the child's income leads to a decrease in the transfer, but the estimates of these effects are much smaller in absolute value than what would be computed in (5). For this reason, they reject the hypothesis of pure altruism. We may distinguish two approaches to explain the monetary transfers in the empirical literature. A first approach is introduced by Cox (1987) : altruistic parents transfer economic means to their children in exchange for services. In this case, if income increases, the threat point of the child also increases and the parent may have to increase his transfer to obtain the desired services. If we find a positive correlation between recipient's income and transfer amount in the data, then the exchange regime hypothesis is verified. In particular, this hypothesis has been tested in many papers and for different countries (Cox 1987; Cox and Rank 1992; Cox, Eser and Jimenex 1998; Secondi 1997) .
A second approach is the one by Cigno, Giannelli and Rosati (1998) . They assume that individuals live for three periods and derive utility from their own consumption. Family network system allow the reallocation of consumption over the life cycle: each middle-aged individual must transfer a specified amount of income to each of the children and a specified amount of income to each of the parents. In this context, credit rationing has a positive effect on the probability of intrafamily transfers, while in the pure altruism model and in the exchange one an increase in rationing produces a decrease in the donor's income and therefore a decrease of the transfer. In particular, Cigno, Giannelli and Rosati (1998) for the factors that affect the probability that the household member will receive a transfer. Next, we restrict our analysis to those families who did receive a positive transfer and examine the factors that affect the size of the transfer.
Public and Private Transfers: Consequences of Government Policies
Family intergenerational transfers have received increasing interest in the economic literature because of their interaction with Government policies.
Indeed, if private and public transfers are 'substitutes', an increase of public transfers might lead to a decrease in private transfers, the so-called 'crowding-out' effect of policy makers instruments. This effect may realize in two ways: firstly, children may reduce private transfers to their retired parents because of the increase of public funds; secondly, parents could use the public transfers they receive to increase their private transfers to children. This topic is particularly interesting in those European developed countries characterized by a growing population of older people and a very low fertility rate (Disney and Johnson, 2001 ), such as Italy.
The reaction of private transfers to Government policies depends on the intrinsic motivation for giving. If private transfers are explained by pure altruism (Barro, 1974 ), as it is described in the previous section, a public policy that forces a transfer from child to parent, through the pension system, but leaves aggregate family income unchanged will have no effect on any family member's consumption. Indeed, the parents will increase private transfers by the exact amount of the due public transfer to assure consumption of both at the previous level. Thus, in this case the policy makers instruments are not efficacious.
If private transfers are motivated by exchange regime hypothesis (Cox, 1987) , transfers from parents may increase in response to an increase in the child's income because the child now needs more compensation to assure the same amount of services. Thus, in this case exchange motivated transfers may strengthen the effects of public transfers. For this reason, this effect is also called 'crowding in' effect in the empirical literature (Kunemund and Rein, 1999) .
As far as the empirical evidence is concerned, Cox and Jimenez (1992) report that families in Peru who obtain social security income are slightly less likely to get private monetary transfers. In particular, simulation models suggest that private transfers would be about 20% higher without a social security programme. In this case, we may observe a crowding-out effect, but it is less than expected by models of pure altruism (100%). Also Jensen (2003) report similar results from SouthAfrica data. Results suggest that each rand of public pension income to elderly people leads to a decrease of about 30% rand in private transfers. Schoeni (2002) explore the interaction between public and private transfers to unemployed people in the USA. He finds that a substantial proportion (24 to 40 cents per dollar) of the unemployed who obtain public benefits receive private support as well, while Cox and Jakubson (1995) , by investigating data of anti-poverty programme in the USA, find a crowding-in effect. Attias-Donfut and Wolff (2000) find a strong positive correlation between the receipt of public transfers and the probability of receiving financial help from parents in France. Kunemund and Rein (1999) 
Data
In Table 1 .
The micro data contains a question, hy080, in which households report regular inter-household cash transfer received. This variable refers to regular monetary A notable feature of transfers in the 2006 survey is that only a minority of household heads received them. Indeed, the data shows that 996 household heads receive cash transfers, the 5 percent of the full sample (transfer receipt in Table 1 ).
Tables 1 reports the average levels of transfers (transfer amount) and the total (disposal) household income for the household heads surveyed.
Averages are reported separately for all sample, recipients and nonrecipients.
While the average size of cash transfers were around 239 euro in the full sample, for household heads who received money transfers in 2006, average size of these transfers were 5150 euro, 23 per cent of the total disposal household income.
Total disposal household income, hy020 variable in EU-SILC 1 , is lower in the recipients sample (22348 euro) than in all sample (28744 euro). Transfers flow from the old to the young, and vice versa. As shown in Figure 1 , the age pattern of transfers received has a peak in the 30-40 years range, but notable is also the 70-80 years range. 
Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. First, we consider the transfer decision and try to account for the factors that affect the probability that the household heads will receive a transfer. Both the altruism and exchange theory predict an inverse relation between the recipient's income and the probability of receiving a transfer. Next, we restrict our analysis to those families who did receive a positive transfer and examine the factors that affect the size of the transfer. Here the altruism theory predict a negative relation between the recipient's income and the size of the transfers, while exchange allows for a positive relation.
A Probit model is estimated to explain the probability of receiving a private transfer:
where "i" index household head, T i is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the household head receives a transfer and 0 otherwise. I ri is recipient's income and I di is donor's income, Z i is a vector including the other covariates described in section III, and i ε is the error term. We hypothesize that if transfers are motivated by altruism or self-interest, 1 α is negative and 2 α is positive, indicating that the lower the recipient's income and the higher the donor' s income, the higher the likelihood of a transfer taking place.
An ordinary Least Squares is estimated to explain the size of the transfer. The dependent variable is the amount of the transfer received by the household head, where the explanatory variables are the same as those used for the study of the transfer decision. The coefficient of interest is 1 β . Both the altruism and exchange theory predict a negative value for 1 β , while exchange allows for a positive value of 1 β . Because of the positive correlation between donor's income and transfers amounts, the coefficient on 2 β is expected to be positive for each transfer motive. Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of the probability of receiving a private transfer. Equation (6) is estimated for all sample. The estimated probit coefficients on recipient's and donor's income have the expected signs and are statistically significant, respectively, at 1 and 5 per cent. These estimates are consistent with both altruism and exchange explanation. This result is in line with previous studies of Cox (1987) and Secondi (1997) .
Empirical Results
Household head who are women are more likely to receive transfers while people who are married have a lower probability of receiving financial transfers than their unmarried counterparts (reference category). Following Cox (1987) , the findings for gender are reconciled with altruistic and exchange models. In the altruistic explanation, the probability of transfer receipt is higher for female because private transfers may compensate women for wage discrimination or interrupt carriers. In the exchange explanation, women, for choice or discriminations, are concentrated in activities that are related to family-oriented services (home production). Home production would raise the demand price and lower the supply price of services (Cox 1987, 535) . The inverse relationship between marital status and the probability of transfer receipt is difficult to explain in the context of the altruistic model. Hence, we re-estimated the transfer equation in Table 2 changing the married variable with a separated/divorced variable. This dummy is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent. As alimonies are included in private support, we interpret this finding as the monetary compensation for the events of separation and divorce. An alternative explanation related to the exchange model is that marriage raises the implicit supply price of services provided to other household heads. Household responsibilities associated with marriage make it less likely for a married couple to exchange services for private transfer income (Cox 1987, 536) . Note. The dependent variable is equal to one if the household head receives a transfer and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The pattern of old to young people is evidenced by the coefficients on the age dummies. Compared to the omitted category of household heads in their twenties, heads in their forties, fifties and especially those aged 60 and over are significantly less likely to be transfer recipients.
Household heads who are well-educated and member of larger families are also more likely to receive transfers. The direct relationship between household size and the probability of transfer receipt can be explained in the context of the altruistic model. Larger families have more potential donors. Hence, if altruism is the motive for transfers, household size should increase the probability of transfer receipt.
However, having children aged between 3 and 5 decreases the probability of receiving transfers while having children age between 16 and 24 increases the likely to have monetary support. Following Cox (1987, 556) , the relationship between young children and the probability of transfer receipt can be explained in the context of the exchange model. Young children place demands on the time of household heads, presumably causing a cutback in the level of services that the household supplies to others.
Household heads who citizenship is not that of European union have lower probability of receiving money transfers than those who citizenship is in the country of residence (reference category).
Clear effect of wealth variables can be inferred from the estimated coefficients.
Homeowner and savings show a negative coefficient, statistically significant at 1 per cent. Therefore, these variables are associated with a lower probability of receiving financial transfers. Finally, household heads who undertake private activities to help others as well as those resides in the Southern regions of Italy have more likely to receive financial support.
The analysis of the probability of receiving transfers is only sufficient to provide evidence in favor or against the altruism and exchange theories. It is necessary to look at the determinants of the size of the transfers. Table 3 reports the ordinary least square results of the estimation of the size of financial transfer. Equation (7) is estimated for the recipients sample. The estimated OLS coefficient on recipient's income is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent. For the average recipient with an income of about 22348 euro, one percent increase in annual income is predicted to raise the amount of transfers by 0.402, from sample mean of about 5150 to 7220 euro. The positive relationship between recipient's income and transfer amount received is consistent with exchange theory. According to the exchange framework, this result seems to indicate that recipients with higher income ask for higher payments in exchange for services provides. This suggestion is confirmed by the estimated coefficients on age dummies. Indeed, the results reported in Table 3 show that compared to the omitted category of household heads in their twenties, recipients in their fifties receive less transfers.
Looking at the other coefficients in Table 3, Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the size of the monetary transfer. The independent variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, ** denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Public and Private Transfers Analysis
We now investigate the relationship between public transfers and private transfers. In particular, we test the crowding-out versus crowding-in hypothesis which a policy makers instrument can realize. Again, a probit and OLS models are used to estimate the probability of private transfer receipt and the amount received, respectively, in which among the independent variable we include also public transfers. Tables 4 and 5 This result is similar to that of Reil-Held (2006) and could be due also to a better regularity of public transfers with respect to non-public incomes. However, our analysis about private intergenerational relations is very relevant for public policy.
The significance of the empirical estimate shows a strong relation between the family and the state. Thus, every policy action has relevant effects on the family behavior about private assistance.
From the results of the previous section, we learn that the motivation underlying the private transfer is also the exchange of future services. Indeed, we see that there is a significant positive coefficient on household income (ln): the higher the household income is, the higher bargaining power of donor is and then the higher the size of transfer must be.
From the empirical results of this section, we observe that the public and the private transfers are substitutes: in case of public transfers increase, private transfers react negatively. In this framework, we try to explain the effect of a Pseudo R-squared 0.14 Log-likelihood -3435.12 Table 5 . Least-squares estimates of the amount of private transfers received and public transfers: recipients Note. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the size of the monetary transfer. The independent variables are described in Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we explore the motivation of monetary transfers received by First, we consider the transfer decision and try to account for the factors that affect the probability that the household member will receive a transfer. Next, we restrict our analysis to those families who did receive a positive transfer and examine the factors that affect the size of the transfer. Because of the interesting interaction between family intergenerational transfers and Government policies, we also explore the relationship between private and public financial transfers.
The main contribution to the existing literature is to investigate the social motivation of private transfers and their implications in terms of policy in a unified framework.
As far as the motivation underlying the private transfers is concerned, the estimated probit coefficients on recipient's and donor's income have the expected signs and are statistically significant, respectively, at 1 and 5 per cent. These estimates are consistent with both altruism and exchange. This result and those relative to the explanatory variables are in line with previous studies of Cox (1987) and Secondi (1997) . Indeed, household head who are women are more likely to receive transfers while people who are married have a lower probability of receiving financial transfers than their unmarried counterparts (reference category). Following Cox (1987) , the findings for gender are reconciled with altruistic and exchange models. In the altruistic explanation, the probability of transfer receipt is higher for female because private transfers may compensate women for wage discrimination or interrupt carriers. In the exchange explanation, women, for choice or discriminations, are concentrated in activities that are related to family-oriented services (home production). Home production would raise the demand price and lower the supply price of services (Cox 1987, 535) .
The inverse relationship between marital status and the probability of transfer receipt is difficult to explain in the context of the altruistic model. Hence, we reestimated the transfer equation changing the married variable with a separated/divorced variable. This dummy is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent. As alimonies are included in private support, we interpret this finding as the monetary compensation for the events of separation and divorce. An alternative explanation related to the exchange model is that marriage raises the implicit supply price of services provided to other household heads. Household responsibilities associated with marriage make it less likely for a married couple to exchange services for private transfer income (Cox 1987, 536) .
However, the analysis of the probability of receiving transfers is only sufficient to provide evidence in favor or against the altruism and exchange theories. It is necessary to look at the determinants of the size of the transfers. The estimated OLS coefficient on recipient's income is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent. For the average recipient with an income of about 22348 euro, one percent increase in annual income is predicted to raise the amount of transfers by 0.402, from sample mean of about 5150 to 7220 euro. The positive relationship between recipient's income and transfer amount received is consistent with exchange theory. According to the exchange framework, this result seems to indicate that recipients with higher income ask for higher payments in exchange for services provides. This suggestion is confirmed by the estimated coefficients on age dummies. Indeed, the results show that compared to the omitted category of household heads in their twenties, recipients in their fifties receive less transfers.
As far as the relationship between the public and private transfers is concerned, again a probit and OLS models are used to estimate the probability of private transfer receipt and the amount received, respectively, in which among the independent variable we include also public transfers. The coefficient of public transfers is in all model negative and statistically significant, respectively, at 1 per cent (probit) and 5 per cent (OLS). The negative correlation between public transfers and private transfer receipt shows that household heads who receive more public transfers must expect to receive a lower private financial help. For the average recipient with public transfers of about 207 euro, one percent increase in public transfers is predicted to decrease the amount of transfers by 0.032, from sample mean of about 5150 to 4985 euro. Hence, the hypothesis about an crowding-out process cannot be rejected.
This result is similar to that of Reil-Held (2006) and could be due also to a better regularity of public transfers with respect to non-public incomes. However, our analysis about private intergenerational relations is very relevant for public policy.
From one hand, we learn that the motivation underlying the private transfer is also the exchange of future services. Indeed, we see that there is a significant positive coefficient on household income (ln): the higher the household income is, the higher bargaining power of donor is and then the higher the size of transfer must be.
From the other hand, we observe that the public and the private transfers are substitutes: in case of public transfers increase, private transfers react negatively.
In this framework, we try to explain the effect of a reduction in public transfers because of the international financial crisis involving the public debt of states.
Since public and private transfers are substitutes, we may expect a positive crowding-out effect on private financial help after a decrease of public transfers.
But since the amount of resources collected by state are not distributed to the families, then we may expect also a reduction of household incomes and then a decrease of private transfers, due to a negative crowding-in effect. Thus, the final result cannot be identified well, because of two opposite forces. For this reason, this topic needs further investigation to pick out other important factors able to describe which force is prevalent.
Naturally, our analysis is implemented in a simple empirical environment and can be improved. First, we should take into account also non-monetary help in the private support analysis. Second, we should investigate not only the receipt transfer but also the giving of transfers. Third, we may explore the endogeneity issue of particular variables. Finally, we might use a dynamic model to verify whether our empirical results are sensitive to the lag between the private and public transfers. 
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